By Steve Dunham

Journal of Homeland Security, February 2002. Copyright 2002 Analytic Services. Reprinted by permission.

As John W. Magaw takes the reins of the new Transportation Security Administration within the federal Department of Transportation, he faces the challenge of overseeing all transportation security matters. The most pressing concern is airline security, evidenced by the name of the legislation that created his agency: the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, signed by President Bush on 19 November 2001. Virtually all of the act’s 21,000-plus words deal with increasing airline security, but the law charges Magaw, as Under Secretary for Transportation Security, with “(1) … civil aviation security, and related research and development activities; and (2) security responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation.”

That covers virtually all transportation in the United States, because the federal Department of Transportation includes the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Coast Guard—just to mention some of its major components. Magaw himself reports to an oversight board that includes Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, the attorney general, and a representative of the Office of Homeland Security.

However, Magaw’s initial task will be to remedy the security deficiencies in air travel in the United States. His responsibility is enormous.

Mandates for the Transportation Security Administration

The Under Secretary for Transportation Security will “be responsible for day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation and intrastate air transportation” and will develop standards for hiring, retaining, training, and testing airport security screening personnel.

On 18 January 2002, the Transportation Security Administration and Federal Aviation Administration published plans for training security screeners and guidance for training flight crews to deal with threats, meeting a deadline in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.

Within three months of the law’s enactment—that is, by 19 February 2002—Magaw must “assume civil aviation security functions and responsibilities” and “implement an aviation security program for charter air carriers.”

Within one year—that is, by 19 November 2002—he must establish a program for screening “passengers and property” at airports, “carried out by the screening personnel of a qualified private screening company.” At every screening location, he “shall order the deployment of law enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms.”

Also within one year, he must deploy “a sufficient number of Federal screeners, Federal Security Managers, Federal security personnel, and Federal law enforcement officers to conduct the screening of all passengers and property” at commercial airports.

Magaw has authority to “provide for deployment of Federal air marshals on every passenger flight”; he must make sure that marshals are deployed on every high-risk flight, as determined by the Secretary of Transportation, and he is responsible for the marshals’ “training, supervision, and equipment.”

The law required screening of “all checked baggage at all airports in the United States” by 19 January 2002. On 16 January 2002, Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta announced the implementation of this requirement: “Every available [explosives-detection system] machine will be used to its maximum capacity. Where we do not yet have [explosives-detection system] resources in place, we will use other options outlined in the law. On originating flights, baggage will be matched to its passenger. Computers will screen passengers, and passengers will be screened for weapons—often multiple times.”

“In addition, more bags will also be subject to sniffing by trained dogs, to more comprehensive screening by both explosive-detection and explosive trace detection devices, to manual searches, or to a combination of those techniques. We will continuously upgrade our screening capability, ultimately meeting the requirement that each checked bag be screened by an explosive detection system by the end of this year.” By 31 December 2002, all large airports must “have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all checked baggage.” The Transportation Security Administration must ensure that the screening systems are fully used and that “if explosive detection equipment at an airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by an alternative means.”

A system for checking air freight must be implemented too, “as soon as practicable.”

By 19 May 2002, Magaw must recommend to airport operators “commercially available measures or procedures to prevent access to secure airport areas by unauthorized persons. As part of the 6-month assessment,” he must “(A) review the effectiveness of biometrics systems currently in use at several United States airports, including San Francisco International; (B) review the effectiveness of increased surveillance at access points; (C) review the effectiveness of card- or keypad-based access systems; (D) review the effectiveness of airport emergency exit systems and determine whether those that lead to secure areas of the airport should be monitored or how breaches can be swiftly responded to; and (E) specifically target the elimination of the ‘piggy-backing’ phenomenon, where another person follows an authorized person through the access point. The 6-month assessment shall include a 12-month deployment strategy for currently available technology.”

The Transportation Security Administration’s other responsibilities include guarding airport perimeters where necessary and defining security standards for airport ground operations such as baggage handling, catering, and vendors.

Magaw has broad authority. He may

• “Require effective 911 emergency call capability for telephones serving passenger aircraft and passenger trains.”
• Establish a uniform system of identifying state and local law enforcement personnel who are authorized to carry weapons in aircraft cabins and to gain access to secured areas of airports.
• Establish requirements for “trusted passenger” programs and use available technologies to expedite the security screening of trusted passengers.
• Develop, with the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, alternative security procedures for transporting medical products that might be damaged by inspection.
• Provide for the use of wireless, wire line data, and other technologies for private and secure communication of threats to aid in screening anyone on airport property who is on a state or federal watch list.
• “In consultation with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, consider whether to require all pilot licenses to incorporate a photograph of the license holder and appropriate biometric imprints.”
• “Provide for the use of voice stress analysis, biometric, or other technologies to prevent a person who might pose a danger to air safety or security from boarding.”
• “Provide for the use of technology that will permit enhanced instant communications and information between airborne passenger aircraft and appropriate individuals or facilities on the ground.”

Research and Development

The Under Secretary for Transportation Security has authority to use the research and development facilities of the Federal Aviation Administration and has authority to “develop and implement methods”:

(1) to use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots in the flight deck to activity in the cabin … (2) to ensure continuous operation of an aircraft transponder in the event of an emergency … (3) to revise the procedures by which cabin crews of aircraft can notify flight deck crews of security breaches and other emergencies.

Funding

The House-Senate appropriations conference committee provides $1.25 billion for Transportation Security Administration civil aviation security services.

In the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Congress appropriated $500 million for fiscal year 2002 for Transportation Department grants to air carriers to fortify cockpit doors, provide video monitors for the cockpit crew to view the passenger cabin, ensure continuous operation of aircraft transponders in an emergency, and to provide “other innovative technologies to enhance aircraft security.” (On 11 January 2002, the Federal Aviation Administration published new standards to protect cockpits from intrusion and small arms fire or fragmentation devices, such as grenades.) Congress authorized, in the same act, $1.5 billion for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 “to reimburse airport operators, on-airport parking lots, and vendors of on-airfield direct services to air carriers for direct costs incurred by such operators to comply with new, additional, or revised security requirements imposed on such operators by the Federal Aviation Administration or Transportation Security Administration on or after September 11, 2001.”

Congress also authorized an additional $50 million a year for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 for Transportation Security Administration research, development, testing, and evaluation of explosives detection technology for checked baggage; new screening technology for carry-on items; threat screening technology for cargo, catering, and duty-free items; evaluation of threats carried on persons boarding aircraft or entering secure areas; evaluation of integrated systems of airport security enhancement; expansion of the existing program for improved methods of education, training, and testing of key airport security personnel; and acceleration of research, development, testing, and evaluation of aircraft-hardening materials and techniques to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to terrorist attack.

Intelligence

The Under Secretary for Transportation Security will also be the central point of intelligence on threats to transportation. Magaw will

• Receive, assess, and distribute intelligence related to transportation security
• Assess threats to transportation
  
• Develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security
  
• Coordinate countermeasures with appropriate government “departments, agencies, and instrumentalities”
• Serve as the primary liaison for transportation security to the intelligence and law enforcement communities
• Work with the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to any actions or activities that may affect aviation safety or air carrier operations
• Work with the International Civil Aviation Organization and appropriate aeronautic authorities of foreign governments to address security concerns on passenger flights by foreign air carriers

During a national emergency, Magaw will “coordinate domestic transportation, including aviation, rail, and other surface transportation, and maritime transportation (including port security)”; “coordinate and oversee the transportation-related responsibilities of other departments and agencies” other than the military departments; “coordinate and provide notice to other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and appropriate agencies of State and local governments, including departments and agencies for transportation, law enforcement, and border control, about threats to transportation.”

The law also directs Magaw to enter memoranda of understanding with other agencies to share or cross-check “data on individuals identified on Federal agency databases who may pose a risk to transportation or national security”; “establish procedures for notifying the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, appropriate State and local law enforcement officials, and airport or airline security officers of the identity of individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety”; “establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers … to use information from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security” and, “if such an individual is identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual”; and “consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with appropriate Federal agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a threat to aviation safety or national security.”

Interagency Coordination

The specter of further skyjackings has created a Herculean agenda for the first year of the Transportation Security Administration. A further challenge will be to integrate the individual transportation security efforts inside and outside the Department of Transportation. Some examples:

• The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, for example, plans to have its field officials “visit most of the nation’s hazardous materials carriers in the coming months” to increase the carriers’ awareness of hazardous materials in relation to terrorist threats.
• The Federal Transit Administration is arranging to have professional security experts conduct security assessments of the 100 largest transit systems and has compiled a Safety and Security Tool Kit.
• The Coast Guard’s missions of maritime security, safety, mobility, law enforcement, and protection of natural resources are a big part of homeland security; the Coast Guard notes that it is at a “heightened state of alert” as it protects more than 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, “America’s longest border.”
• Amtrak, the national intercity rail passenger operator, announced on 5 October 2001 that passengers at any station on the Washington, DC–Boston corridor (where virtually all stations have ticket agents) would be required to have a ticket prior to boarding a train. Photo identification is now necessary to purchase tickets on board trains or in stations or when checking baggage. Amtrak also proposed $3.2 billion in accelerated federal funding for increased security, safety and capacity measures, including bomb-detection technology, surveillance enhancements and the addition of 150 police officers to Amtrak’s national accredited police force.
• The American Public Transportation Association has published a briefing titled “Terrorism and Public Transportation” and on its website provides links to information on threat assessment and countermeasures.
• The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center has published a Transit Security Handbook.
• The Transportation Research Board’s 81st annual meeting, in January 2002, was devoted to transportation security.
• The Washington (DC) Metropolitan Area Transit Authority has requested $190 million in federal money “to fund additional security enhancements as well as the expansion of an existing chemical-biological sensor detection program.”

On paper, at least, Magaw may have some responsibility for the success or failure of all these efforts, but the Transportation Security Administration will probably have its hands full for the first year trying to meet all the aviation security actions mandated in its establishing legislation. However, one role the law assigns to the Under Secretary for Transportation Security is to receive, assess, and distribute intelligence related to transportation security. This is one job that no one else appears to be doing yet, and it may be more important than the other work that Magaw must do once he has time and resources to devote to modes of transportation other than air travel.

Beyond the intelligence function, the training, security, and personnel now being provided to the air travel system could be done for the other modes of transportation as well.

A Plan

On 6 September 2000, the U.S. Department of Transportation released a new strategic plan. Under its National Security Strategic Goal, “Ensure the security of the transportation system for the movement of people and goods, and support the National Security Strategy,” it specified seven desired outcomes, quoted from the strategy:

1. Reduce the vulnerability of the transportation system and its users to crime and terrorism
2. Increase the capability of the transportation system to meet national defense needs
3. Reduce the flow of illegal drugs entering the United States
4. Reduce the flow of migrants illegally entering the United States
5. Reduce illegal incursions into our sovereign territory
6. Increase support for United States interests in promoting regional stability
7. Reduce transportation-related dependence on foreign fuel supplies

The plan recognized the needs to “identify and reduce the vulnerabilities of all modes of transportation to security threats” and to “detect and counter threats to the security of the transportation system.” It also acknowledged the need for increased airline security, stating:

Following the recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, [the Federal Aviation Administration] will expand its research to develop better technology and procedures to prevent weapons and explosive devices from being taken aboard commercial aircraft. Working with airlines and airports, [the Federal Aviation Administration] will continue to purchase and deploy advanced aviation security equipment, monitor its use, and test and assess performance of security programs including access control and cargo. The planned certification of screening companies is expected to increase levels of screener professionalism.

Having predated the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks by more than a year, the Department of Transportation’s strategic plan has the advantage of taking a broader view of transportation security and not reacting to the air system vulnerability identified by the 11 September attacks. Another round of terrorism could expose other vulnerabilities. If the Aum Shinrikyo gas attack in the Tokyo subway system were duplicated in New York, it could provide another reactive assault on transportation security deficiencies. However, the U.S. Department of Transportation has a strategic plan already, and though its implementation was neither thorough enough nor swift enough to prevent a catastrophic breach of transportation security, it may still be a solid outline for establishing transportation security in the future.